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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT 
OF APPEALS 
Case No. 890544 BRUCE P. PALMER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to 
review a Rule 31 decision of the Court of Appeals clearly-
supported by case law and statute? 
2. Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to 
consider whether all actions, officers, undertakings, 
legislation, elected officials, courts and other activities 
of the State of Utah are unconstitutional? 
3. Is Salt Lake City preempted by Federal law from 
regulating location of certain structures, including 
satellite dish antennas, in front yards? 
4. Should the City be awarded its costs and fees for 
replying to this groundless Petition? 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals determined to review the Circuit 
Court's conviction under its Rule 31, R. Utah Ct. App., 
procedure and affirmed the trial court's conviction without 
an opinion on November 29, 1989. 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
The Petition fails to comply with Rule 46(a)(6)(D), 
R.U.S.C., in that it fails to specify the statutory 
provisions conferring jurisdiction on this Court to grant 
the Writ of Certiorari. Further, nowhere in the Petition is 
there any citation or references to any "special and 
important reasons'' provided in Rule 43, R.U.S.C., for the 
grant of Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Salt Lake City Ordinance: 
§ 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The area of a 
required front yard shall be open and unobstructed 
except for the following which are permitted: 
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar structures as 
provided elsewhere by this chapter. 
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main building; 
provided, however, that they are not more than four 
feet in height and do not cause any danger or hazard 
to traffic by obstructing the view of the street or 
intersection. Any portion of any steps, covered or 
uncovered, that are more than four feet above grade 
must be back of the required setback line. 
(3) Eaves or cornices projecting not more than two 
feet, 
(4) Driveway leading to a properly located garage or 
parking area; provided, however, no portion of a front 
yard as required in this ordinance, except for those 
approved driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled 
Of course, since the Petition claims that neither this 
Court nor any governing legislation passed by the 
Legislature is constitutionally valid it would be difficult 
for the Petition to allege that the Court has any 
jurisdition whatsoever. 
so as to encourage or make possible the parking of 
automobiles, nor shall the city allow any curb cuts or 
approve any driveways except for entrance and exit 
driveways leading to properly located parking areas. 
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in required 
front yard areas of single family dwellings leading to 
and from a properly located garage or carport on the 
property subject to the following conditions: 
(a) All such drives shall be of concrete 
construction. 
(b) Such drives shall not be over twelve (12) 
feet in width. 
(c) There shall be an area in landscaping at 
least fifteen (15) feet in depth from the front 
property line to the farthest edge of the drive. 
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used for the 
parking or storage of any trailer, boat or other 
equipment at any time, nor is the area to be 
used for overnight or permanent parking of any 
vehicle. 
(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked on 
driveways serving private residences, provided 
the automobile is parked completely on private 
property. 
Federal Communication Commission Regulation. 47 CFR 
Ch. 1 (10-1-88 edition) §25.104. 
State and local zoning or other regulations that 
differentiate between satellite receive-only antennas 
and other types of antenna facilities are preempted 
unless such regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, 
safety or aesthetic objective; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable 
limitations on, or prevent, reception of satellite 
delivered signals by receive-only antennas or to 
impose costs on the users of such antennas that are 
excessive in light of the purchase and installation 
cost of the equipment. 
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas is 
preempted in the same manner except that sate and 
local health and safety regulation is not preempted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a continuing appeal from a criminal conviction 
after a jury trial in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake 
City, the Honorable Floyd H. Gowens presiding, on the 
charges of placing an illegal structure in a front yard 
under the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, § 51-5-7. 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
At trial on July 5, 1989 a jury of the Third Circuit 
Court found the defendant had not complied with an order 
from Salt Lake City's Building and Housing Division 
concerning placement of a satellite dish antenna in the 
petitioner's front yard and was, accordingly, guilty of 
violating § 51-5-7, R.O.S.L.C. Petitioner's appeal to the 
Court of Appeals was heard on the Court's Rule 31 calendar 
and the decision was affirmed on November 29, 1989. 
C. 
FACTS OF THE CASE2 
1. Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is the owner of 
the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue• 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51). 
2. Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building 
and Housing Division received a complaint concerning 833 
East Pennsylvania Avenue (R.37). At that location, he 
observed a satellite dish antenna located in the front yard 
(R.38). Spangenberg advised the defendant that the 
satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of Salt 
Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987. (R. 43). 
3. On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a 
Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying the 
defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the 
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish 
located in his front yard before January 4, 1988. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). 
4. A misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January 6, 
1988 (CR 1-2). 
Throughout the entire Petition for the Writ of Certiorari, 
in violation of Rule 46 (a)(8), there is not a single 
citation to the record. 
5. Palmer was advised of his right to apply for a 
variance on December 31, 1988 (R. 45). Palmer did not 
apply for a variance (R. 47). At trial on July 5, 1989, 
the jury found the defendant had not complied with the 
notice and order (R.52) and was guilty of violating §51-5-
7, R.O.S.L.C. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Salt Lake City's regulation of front yard 
structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas, 
is not preempted by federal law because Salt Lake's 
regulation does not differentiate between satellite receive 
only antennas and other types of antennas and the Salt Lake 
City ordinance has reasonable health, safety and aestetic 
objectives that do not impose unreasonable limitations on 
satellite received signals. 
2. Palmer's six other issues including the trial 
court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court lacking 
jurisdiction because of various failures to file oaths are 
without any substantial merit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SALT LAKE CITY'S REGULATION OF FRONT 
YARD STRUCTURES INCLUDING SATELLITE 
RECEIVE ONLY ANTENNAS IS NOT PREEMPTED 
BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The pivotal issue in his case is whether Salt Lake 
City Ordinance § 51-5-7 regulating what structures are 
permissible on front yards is preempted by Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) regulation• 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a 
federal law may preempt a state law where conflict exists 
between the federal and state law. U.S. Constitution 
Article VI, §2. Similarly federal regulations may preempt 
state and local laws. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81 
L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). A federal regulation preempts local 
law if the federal agency has exercised complete authority 
in the area in question and if the agency is legally 
authorized to preempt local law. New York v. FCC, 100 
L.Ed.2d 45, 57-59 (1988). 
In this case the FCC has exercised its regulatory 
authority over satellite receive only dish antennas. The 
federal regulations, however, specifically allow local 
control under certain guidelines. Federal Regulation 47 
CFR §25.104 states that all local laws inconsistent with 
3 its requirements are preempted. 
The FCC has adopted regulations dealing specifically 
with federal preemption of local zoning for satellite 
antennas, entitled, "Preemption of Local Zoning of Earth 
Stations." 47 CFR §25.104. This regulation establishes the 
following standards for preempting local law. 
State and local zoning or other regulations that 
differentiate between satellite receive-only antennas 
and other types of antenna facilities are preempted 
unless such regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, 
safety or aesthetic objective; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations 
on, or prevent, reception of satellite delivered 
signals by receive-only antennas or to impose costs on 
the users of such antennas that are excessive in light 
of the purchase and installation cost of the 
equipment. 
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas is 
preempted in the same manner except that state and 
local health and safety regulation is not preempted. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3 
It is unclear whether the FCC in promulgating the 
preemption, has acted within the boundaries of its 
authority. In Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 
F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988), defendants asserted that the FCC 
had exceeded its authority in preempting local regulations 
of satellite antenna. The court held that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider this issue bacause, "before 
an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must 
have been given the opportunity to reconsider its position" 
Id. at 1029. However, for the purpose of this Brief, it is 
assumed that the FCC has legal authority to preempt local 
law. The fact that the FCC has not reconsidered its positin 
on preemption in this case, or others, may perhaps defeat 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to consider 
this issue. 
This regulation establishes an initial standard to 
determine if federal preemption occurs, i.e. the local 
zoning ordinance must differentiate between satellite 
receive only antennas and other types of antennas before 
federal preemption occurs. If a local ordinance 
differentiates between satellite receive only antenna and 
other types of antenna facilities federal preemption is 
still not automatic. The federal regulation then provides 
a two part balancing test. If the local restriction: (1) 
is reasonably related to health, safety or aesthetic 
objectives, and, (2) does not impose costly burdens and 
limitations on satellite users; it is not preempted by 
federal law. 
The threshold question thus is whether the City 
ordinance ''differentiates" between "satellite receive-only 
antenna" and "other types of antenna facilities." Palmer 
was convicted of violating Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 
which states, in part, "[T]he area of a required front yard 
shall be open and unobstructed except for the following 
which are permitted: 
(1) A fence or wall . . . 
(2) Uncovered steps . . . 
4 
Van Meter, supra, at 1029-1031; Breelinq v. Churchill, 423 
N.W.2d 469, 471 (Neb. 1988); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Northvale, 
530 A.2d 839, 844 (N.J. Super. a.D. 1987); Minars v. Rose, 
507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (A.D.2d Dept. 1986); Ross v. Hatfield, 
640 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.Kan. 1988). 
(3) Eaves or cornices . . . 
(4) A driveway leading to a properly 
placed garage . . . 
(5) Circular driveways • . ." 
Section 51-5-7 does not differentiate between types of 
antennas. It does not allow any type of antenna, whether 
satellite, UHF, VHF, or radio antenna, to be placed in a 
front yard. This section simply lists five (5) permitted 
structures which can be placed in front yards. Since the 
City ordinance prohibits all types of antenna from being 
placed in front yards, it does not discriminate among the 
various types of antenna. Thus, the City's ordinance meets 
the FCC's first requirement and preemption is unwarranted. 
Even if the discrimination test was met, §51-5-7, 
would still survive the two part balancing test and there 
would be no federal preemption. The purpose of the 
ordinance is to diminish the unsightly visual impact of 
antenna by prohibiting placement in a front yard. The 
ordinance alleviates the concern with the surrounding 
property values which may be diminished by placing antenna 
in a front yard. Some safety concerns may also be achieved 
by preventing antenna placement in front yards to avoid the 
5 hazards of a fallen or windblown antenna. 
The City ordinance must not prevent or impose 
unreasonable limitations on satellite reception; nor impose 
unreasonable costs. Here, the City ordinance does not 
completely prohibit the use of satellite antenna or other 
antenna facilities. The ordinance simply prevents front 
yard placement of all antennas. Alternative placement 
sites are easily available and Salt Lake Code §51-5-6 
specifically allows for rear yard placement. Other 
placement alternatives, such as side yard or roof top 
placement may be sought. Furthermore, the City is not 
5 
Salt Lake City Code Section 21.02.020 (the successor to 
§51-1-2, R.O.S.L.C.) provides: 
21.02.020 Purpose of Title 21 provisions. 
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of 
promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, 
order, prosperity and welfare of the present and 
future inhabitants of Salt Lake City, including among 
other things: 
A. The lessening of congestion in the streets or 
roads; 
B. Securing safety from fire and other dangers; 
C. Providing adequate light and air; 
D. Classification of land uses and distribution of 
land development and utilization; 
E. Protection of the tax base; 
F. Securing economy in governmental expenditures; 
and 
G. Fostering the City's industrial, business and 
residential development. (Prior code §51-1-2). 
insensitive to the unique needs and circumstances of 
individuals and properties• Should no other placement 
alternative be available, a satellite user may apply for a 
variance to place his satellite in a front yard location. 
The City ordinance neither imposes nor creates unreasonable 
costs upon the satellite user. Unlike other ordinances, 
the City ordinance does not impose costly screenings or 
barriers to be placed around a satellite antenna. 
In Van Meter, supra, the town of Maplewood passed an 
ordinance prohibiting the placement of satellite antenna in 
front yards and on roof tops. The ordinance required a 10 
foot height limitation and the satellite dish to be 
enclosed by a 6 foot wall of evergreen shrubbery to hide 
its visibility from adjoining property and from the 
streets. Plaintiff, after unsuccessfully applying for a 
variance, placed his satellite antenna on his roof. The 
Township of Maplewood commenced action to enforce the 
township ordinance. The court held that although the town 
ordinance had a legitimate health, safety and aesthetic 
object, it discriminated against satellite antenna users. 
The court held that the ordinance singled out satellite 
antennas over "other types of antenna facilities," and, in 
fact, excluded from the ordinances' coverage UHF, VHF and 
radio antennas similarly placed. The court further 
concluded that the screening requirements of evergreen 
shrubbery were too costly a burden placed on the satellite 
user. 
Unlike the Van Meter case Salt Lake City does not 
differentiate between antennas. It makes all types of 
antennas subject to the same requirement, they are not 
permitted structures in front yard areas and therefore 
federal preemption would not apply. Even if, arguendo, 
differentiation could be found the Salt Lake City Ordinance 
meets the requirements that there is a reasonable relation 
to health, safety and aesthetic objectives and there is no 
costly burden or limitation on satellite receive-only 
antenna users. 
POINT II. 
PALMER'S REMAINING ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Palmer has asserted numerous other issues in this 
Petition, fortunately not as many as he raised below. 
Issue number 6 raises the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Defendant alleges that counsel failed to argue 
federal preemption and failed to introduce photographs of 
other satellite dishes located in Salt Lake City to prove 
defendant's selective enforcement argument. The record, 
however, indicates that both of these points were argued to 
the court by counsel. Counsel introduced evidence of other 
satellite dishes (R. 61, 62) and attempted to argue the 
issue of federal preemption to the court (R. 90). 
This Court has set forth the standards that must be 
met to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The defendant must first show that "specific 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance" and second, that he 
was prejudiced as a result of the alleged deficiencies, 
i.e., the defendant must "affirmatively show that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's error, 
the result would have been different. Petitioner's alleged 
omissions did not occur and therefore do not constitute the 
required showing. This issue should be dismissed. 
Because of their obvious lack of merit the City will 
not address Petitioner's issues numbers 3, 4, 5 and 8 
dealing with the unconstitutionality of the entire 
government of the State of Utah. 
POINT III. 
THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE PETITIONER 
FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS, HARASSING 
AND DELAYING APPEAL. 
As noted above, the Petition fails in numerous 
respects to comply with the Rules of this Court. There is 
no proper statement for the basis of jurisdiction; there is 
no citation to the record; and, there is no statement of 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). These standards 
have been adopted by this Court in State v. Pursifell, 746 
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987). 
any "special and important reason" for the grant of the 
Writ. 
This Petition, especially issues numbers 3, 4, 5 and 
8, violates Rule 33(a) in that it is clearly frivolous and 
for the purpose of delay. It also violates Rule 40(a) in 
that there could be no good faith grounds formed after 
reasonable inquiry for this Court to grant the Writ. 
As in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), 
Petitioner's mischaracterization of the record, failure to 
follow the rules, abuse of appellate process and other 
transgressions warrants the imposition of sanctions. See 
also, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briqham City v. Mantua Town, 754 
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 
365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 
750 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 is not preempted by 
FCC regulation. It equally regulates all types of 
antennas. The ordinance does not discriminate among 
antennas and does not create unreasonable limitations on 
satellite users. Therefore, federal preemption is 
unwarranted. The remainder of Palmer's issues are 
frivolous and do not merit consideration by this Court. 
The jury verdict finding the defendant guilty should be 
sustained by this Court and the City should be awarded 
sanctions. 
DATED this let day of J <7\A^a/-S , 1990. 
BATRD 
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